Security
Quantum-safe cryptography.
A date on every step, key agreement first: traffic recorded today could be decrypted later.
| Step | What changes | Date |
|---|---|---|
| Inventory; SHA-384, P-384, AES-256 | This roadmap (ISM-2073), and the longer hash, curve and key ASD names | Done |
| SHA-3 and SHAKE | The base of ML-KEM and ML-DSA (FIPS 202) | November 2026 |
| AES-256 for connections | TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 offered first | December 2026 |
| ML-KEM, hybrid | X25519 with ML-KEM-768 offered on every outbound connection (FIPS 203) | March 2027 |
| ML-DSA-87 | Release, licence and update signatures (FIPS 204) | June 2027 |
| ML-KEM-1024 | Every link where both ends are Senua AI's | June 2027 |
| No classical public key alone | Every key agreement and signature Senua AI controls | December 2027 |
Others' certificates move as their authorities issue ML-DSA; we verify them from June 2027.
How we measure up to Australian guidance
- Australian Signals Directorate
- It asks for a plan by the end of 2026, a start by 2028 and a finish by 2030. This page is our plan, with everything Senua AI controls due by December 2027.
- ISM-1917
- New cryptographic software must support five algorithms by 2030. We already support SHA-384, SHA-512 and AES-256; ML-KEM-1024 and ML-DSA-87 are due in June 2027.
- CSIRO's method
- We follow it: map every use of cryptography, then fix the most exposed first.
- Independent assessment
- An IRAP assessor judges compliance for a whole system, not a single product, so we publish this register for assessors and customers to check.